Abstract-Satellite based localization systems are currently applied in various domains in transportation for information purposes. For example in railways for passenger information, in automotive for navigation or in aviation to precisely follow flight paths. These applications are mainly non-safety relevant because of a missing certification. In this paper a development strategy towards the certification of safety relevant applications in transportation with the example of railways is shown.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to achieve different targets which are introduced in this chapter.
A. System architecture enabling safe satellite based localization
The system architecture of the targeted localization unit needs to be railway specific to consider their safety requirements and conditions. The architecture shall be regarded from the technical and functional perspective as well as by the process cycles it shall fulfil.
B. Safe functionality of localization unit
The safe functionality of the localization unit contains procedures to control system malfunctions or failures. This includes beside the functions the construction of the safe system architecture.
C. Safety case and safety assessment
To enable the safety assessment of the localization unit, an safety and reliability analysis of the system, its requirements and specifications are necessary. Furthermore, non-operational and operational tests are necessary to proof the functionality of the system under real conditions.
II. APPROACH APPLIED
In this chapter, the applied approach of this paper is introduced. Therefore, in subchapter A the implementation of targets is focused, in subchapter B the relevance of the normative background is emphasized followed by the output documents in subchapter C.
A. Implementation of targets
The achievement of the focused targets shall lead to a developed localization unit which can be used as localization device in train control systems replacing currently used technologies which are track side like balises or axle counters. This will enable a more precise and continuous instead of a discrete train localization leading to higher capacity and flexibility of tracks and energy efficient driving. The train control system targeted are modern train control systems like ETCS. Nevertheless, the integration into other train control systems using the respective interfaces is possible. This guarantees the safety of the traffic process by technical and organizational measures.
B. Normative background
The introduced approach is only feasible if the normative background of all domains involved -railways and satellite based localization -involved is considered. This includes e.g. national and international (European) laws and regulations as well as technical standards, specifications and documents of the operators and manufacturers. The normative background can be summarized as the relevant input documents for the development and certification of the localization unit.
C. Output documents
During the design, development and manufacturing of the localization unit, output documents need to be created which are the base for the certification process. The certification is necessary for the targeted public operation of the train, it is concluded with a safety assessment proofing the safety case towards a national safety authority.
III. LOCALISATION SENSORS
For the localization of any object, sensors are necessary. In railways, the train control system requires position information to guide the trains according the safety requirements. It has to be guaranteed that sensors deliver the according to information in the requested quality. They can be positioned at the transportation object (person/ good), at the transportation infrastructure, in the traffic-control system and on the means of transportation. In this paper, the target is to allocate the sensor solely at the means of transport because of the disadvantages of the other options. A sensor at the transportation object would always need to be carried with the object, even if it is not in traffic at this moment. Sensors at the transportation infrastructure are exposed to environment and require a huge amount of cabling especially in remote areas. The same applies to sensors in the traffic control system which is currently only installed at a part of the network.
A. Structure of sensors
Sensors on the means of transportation enable an autonomous self localization. The integration of the sensor outputs are necessary for a safe and precise localization. After deciding for the position of the sensor, the way of combining the sensor output including map matching with the target of a safe localization needs to be regarded. This process is initiated with the clear definition of the system boarders as base for its planning, design, development and construction. This can be done by structuring the system according the aspect of functions, of products and of location. This approach allows three different perspectives of the system resulting in the decomposition of the system introduced in the following subchapters.
B. Aspect of functions
With the aspect of functions, not only the main targeted function of the localization unit but as well sub-functions can be shown clearly structured. This allows not only the design and development of the system based on the required functions but as well the validation as part of the safety assessment.
C. Aspect of product
The aspect of product decomposes the localization unit into its components, parts and interfaces. This approach shows the links to other products and components of other systems. This includes the sensors of the localization unit and the infrastructure they are using.
D. Aspect of allocation
The aspect of allocation shows the structure of the localization unit inside the vehicle including the allocation of the sensors and the calculating units. This structure allows to check if there is enough space on the train or if unwanted interferences could occur.
E. Combination of aspects
By showing the important parts of the system and the decomposition, the system boarders are implicitly defined. All elements not defined as system elements are not part of the system and therefore not considered. Nevertheless, interactions of the system to other systems need to be considered which shall be part of the system definition. The combination of aspects is shown in Figure 1 . 
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
By showing the parts of the system and with the decomposition, the system boarders are implicitly defined. All elements not defined as system elements are not part of the system and therefore not considered. Nevertheless, interactions of the localization system to other systems and environment need to be considered which has to be part of the system definition. The structuring of the system is an essential base to show how the sensors are combined to guarantee a safe and certifiable localization. With the decomposition, the requirements can be well structured to reach these targets.
Localization in transportation has the target to determine the movement state of a means of transportation in a reference system to guarantee the safety of operation for protection of the flanks, protection of on-head collisions, rear-end collision, protection against derailment by speed supervision by means of the control and protection system. A further step -which is not focused in this paper but where this paper serves as important base for -is the integration of the satellite based localization unit into a modern train control system. To reach this step, a safe and fast communication system from the train to the train control center delivering the localization information and to send movement authorities from the train control center to the train is necessary. With this approach, the superimposed target -the safe transport of goods and persons -shall be reached.
Currently, safe localization in railways is carried out by track side equipment, which is partially supported by vehicle based equipment. The replacement of these components like axle counters, balises and looped circuits with satellite bases solutions has been discussed in several research projects in the past. However the qualification of the localization solution has not been carried out yet because the used sensors are not qualified/ certified. The sensor outputs have to be used and combined leading to a level of safety requested by railway standardization. As potential sensors for the satellite based localization unit, three potential categories are available and useful. These are sensors for satellite-based localization, a digital map and additional sensors. The sensor for satellitebased localization can use one or several satellite based localization systems (GNSS) as signal input to calculate the position of the antenna and accordingly of the vehicle. As GNSS, the US-American system GPS and the Russian system GLONASS are available. The European system Galileo and the Chinese system COMPASS are currently under construction. GNSS generally consists of a control segment, a space segment and a user segment. GPS, GLONASS and COMPASS offer as guaranteed signals only military signals, the open available signals are not guaranteed. Galileo is the only GNSS which offers a civil guaranteed service with its safety of life service. The accuracy of satellite based localization can be additionally increased by using augmentation systems. This can be ground based augmentation systems (GBAS) and space based augmentation systems (SBAS). GBAS are for example DGPS (Differential GPS), SBAS are e.g. the European EGNOS or the American WAAS. These systems use ground based monitoring stations including the transmission of augmentation information to the user with satellites.
The digital map should comply with domain specific requirements and shall be compatible within the specific domain. For railways, the digital map should be advisably designed based on the railML standard. The digital map has to be compiled separately for each used railway line, therefore a convenient and smooth algorithm to compile digital maps is desirable. Same applies to the permanent improvement of the digital map by a special algorithm to be developed and implemented.
Different kinds of additional sensors are available: an inertial sensor, a wheel speed sensor, balises, radar or eddy current sensor can be used as odometer. Inertial sensors calculate the driven distance and the speed by measuring oscillations. Wheel speed sensors count the rotations of the wheel at the direct contact of vehicle and infrastructure. Localization by track fixed balises/ RFID requires their installation at the infrastructure and an antenna on the vehicles, the vehicle can deliver the position and further information.
The fusion of all sensor data is done with a safe computer by a map matching algorithm resulting in a safe train localization. To enable a precise localization, the accuracy of the digital map is of essential importance.
The safe localization information is calculated out of two independent sensor channels, the results of both channels are compared. The safe localization output is only given if the results of both calculations are within a defined confidence interval.
The combination of aspects can be applied to the satellite based localization unit and its possible implementation into ETCS. To guarantee the safety, the safe localization information is derived from two independent sensor channels, the results of both channels are compared. The safe localization output is only given if the results of both calculations are within a defined confidence interval. The architecture is summarized in Figure 2 . 
Figure 2: Resulting architecture of localization unit
Generally, the application of satellite based localization can be certified generic or domain specific. A generic certification would require certified sensors which are currently not available. Therefore a domain specific certification is necessary with the integration of the sensor output into the standardized domain specific procedures.
V. INNOVATION OF THIS APPROACH
Currently, safe localization in railways is carried out by track side equipment, which is partially supported by vehicle based equipment. The replacement of these components like axle counters, balises and looped circuits with satellite bases solutions has been discussed in several research projects in the past, the qualification of the localization solution has not been carried out yet because the used sensors are not qualified/ certified. The sensor outputs have to be used and combined leading to a level of safety requested by railway standardization.
A. GNSS as sole localisation in railways
The innovative safety relevant application of satellite based localization in transportation has been focused in a large number of previous projects. Those projects proved the general feasibility of this approach but did not lead to an application in scheduled operation. Applications using satellite based localization in passenger operation do not rely on GNSS as safety relevant localization but use e. g. radio or balises for localization in cases of GNSS unavailability. Train control which planned to use GNSS for localization purposes have not been finished so far because of several reasons. As well in aviation wherefore GNSS have been designed a general use for safety relevant localization is not certified. The certification is only available for specific aircrafts and specific airports.
B. COTS
Due to the development of GNSS according the requirements of aviation satellite based localization needs to be integrated in railways as external component. This is done as components-off-the-shelf (COTS). With this approach it has to be shown during the certification as part of the documented safety case that the non-safe information delivered by COTS is converted to a safe information by special methods in the localization unit.
C. Communication
A further step which is not focused in this paper but where this paper is a base for is the integration of the satellite based localization unit into a modern train control system. To reach this step. A safe and fast communication system from the train to the train control center delivering the localization information and to send movement authorities from the train control center to the train. With this approach, the main targetthe safe transport of goods and persons -shall be reached.
VI. METHOD OF SAFETY CASE AND ASSESSMENT
The development is accompanied by the documentation of the safety case according the state of the art of the relevant domain, in this case railways. The safety case is prepared by the manufacturer to prove towards the assessor and the safety authority the safe development of the system. Within the safety case it has to be shown in detail how the targeted safety shall be reached. The structured documentation of the safety case is described in the normative background. The certification is necessary for the targeted regular operation of the train, it is concluded with a safety assessment proofing the safety towards a national safety authority.
Generally, the application of satellite based localization can be certified generic or domain specific. A generic certification would require the certification of the sensors which is currently not available. Therefore a domain specific certification is necessary. The sensor output has to be integrated into the standardized domain specific procedures.
A. Certification of COTS
The innovative application of COTS requires an innovative certification process with the target to comply with safety requirements. Therefore the existing certification process has to be adopted but still needs to be according the railway V-model. Nevertheless, COTS have not been developed according railway requirements but still shall fulfil safety relevant functions. The output of COTS-sensors needs to be treated as unsafe information but is still useful. The usage of COTS has nevertheless the advantage to use already developed components leading to a lower price and furthermore allowing the modular exchangeability of components. Within the system development, the information delivered by COTS have to be processed accordingly to enable a safe localization.
B. Responsibilities in the certification process
In certification processes used in railways the normative responsibilities have to be regarded, they are summarized in Figure 3 . There it is shown that with increasing requirements to the safety level to be reached more institutions need to be involved because of the higher independency required. Despite various implemented safety measures failures can occur at every technical system due to its physical or chemical properties [1] , the development of a system without hazards is not possible [2] .
The operational risk can be determined with a safety analysis [3] which makes the structuring of the system necessary. For the safety of the single components a hazard analysis can be carried out for all or for determined characteristics of the system [4] .
The resulting suggested certification process is summarized in Figure 4 . For the safe system development is an according documentation, a continuation of the safety consideration during operation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The resulting safe architecture and implementation into the ETCS architecture is introduced in this paper. The design and development is followed by a proof of safety and a safety assessment. Beside the safety issues, satellite based localization in railways has various major benefits. These can be categorized into operational benefits, benefits for maintenance, economic benefits, social and ecological benefits.
